Integrating Players, Reputation and Ranking to Manage

Cheating in MMOGs by Botvich, Dmitri et al.
Integrating Players, Reputation and Ranking to Manage
Cheating in MMOGs
Dmitri Botvich
TSSG
Waterford Institute of
Technology, Ireland
Jimmy McGibney
TSSG
Waterford Institute of
Technology, Ireland
Georgy Ostapenko
TSSG
Waterford Institute of
Technology, Ireland
Stefano De Paoli
Dept of Sociology
National University of
Ireland, Maynooth
Aphra Kerr
Dept of Sociology
National University of
Ireland, Maynooth
Max Keatinge
Dept of Sociology
National University of
Ireland, Maynooth
ABSTRACT
In this paper, we propose an approach that uses in-game
reputation as a solution to the problem of cheating in mas-
sively multiplayer online games. What constitutes cheating
is however quite context-specific and subjective, and there is
no universal view. Thus our approach aims to adjust to the
particular forms of cheating to which players object rather
than deciding a priori which forms of cheating should be
controlled.
The main feature of our approach is an architecture and
model for maintaining player-based and context-appropriate
trust and reputation measures, with the integration of these
into the game’s ranking system. When an avatar loses rep-
utation, our approach intervenes to reduce its ranking. It
is envisaged that players will come to attach value to repu-
tation in its own right. We also present the results of rela-
tively large-scale simulations of various scenarios involving
sequences of encounters between players, with an initial im-
plementation of our reputation and ranking model in place,
to observe the impact on cheaters (and non-cheaters).
Keywords
Massive multiplayer online games, cheating, reputation, trust.
1. INTRODUCTION
Massively Multiplayer Online Games (MMOGs) are a highly
successful sub-sector of the digital games industry whereby
players participate in a virtual world [1, 2] which is persis-
tent, meaning that it runs independently of the user and re-
quires continuous support from the game developer. MMOGs
are both highly sophisticated technological systems - in most
cases built around a client-server architecture - and ‘deeply
social’ worlds [3, 4, 5] in which millions of players chat, co-
operate, interact, compete and trade with each other online
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through their avatars. Notable examples of these types of
games are World of Warcraft (WoW) or Lineage.
In this paper we lay the foundation for an approach that
uses in-game reputation as a solution to one of the problems
that affects MMOGs, including role-playing games: cheat-
ing. We consider cheating in MMOGs as the group of actions
that provide cheaters with unfair advantages over other play-
ers. Empirical studies of game play have shown that cheat-
ing in MMOGs is a highly contested and variable practice.
It deserves particular attention because it is often perceived
by the developers, publishers and some players to be a threat
to the social experience, economic viability and security of a
game world [6]. For others, cheating is viewed as justifiable
because it offers the potential to generate large amounts of
real and virtual money, or to progress more easily in the
game rankings. By using a context sensitive and player-
driven strategy, we propose an approach that aims to adjust
to the particular forms of cheating to which players object,
rather than deciding a priori which forms of cheating should
be controlled.
The main idea of our approach is that the proper inte-
gration of a player-based and context-appropriate reputa-
tion mechanism into the game’s ranking systems can lead to
a sustainable solution to the problem of cheating. In this
paper we describe the motivation for adopting such an ap-
proach and we also formalize an approach for the integration
of the game rankings with a reputation system. With our
approach it will become possible to use the reputation sys-
tem to detect cheaters and mitigate the unfair advantage ob-
tained. Speifically, we try to intervene in the ranking of the
avatars belonging to cheaters within a game, where we con-
sider ranking as a value that reflects the level of the in-game
persona or avatar. Our approach intervenes by reducing the
ranking of an avatar, when this avatar has a negative rep-
utation (i.e. it is rated by the large player community as a
cheater). The system should be able to identify cheaters and
minimize their possibilities to gain a high ranking. On the
other hand, fair players should be able to gain high ranking
depending on their skills and experience. In general, players
should be motivated to avoid cheating as counterproductive:
after some time both the reputation and rankings of cheaters
should be lower than those of non-cheaters.
We adopt in particular an interdisciplinary approach in
this paper that mixes computing technical knowledge and
competences with social sciences empirical research. In-
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deed, we are convinced that building sustainable solutions
for end users and service providers can be done successfully
on the basis of a mutual collaboration among disciplines and
by a technical design that must be informed by contextual
and situational knowledge of social needs (i.e. we reject the
ideas of social models and user requirements that can be
just transplanted/implemented into technical solutions). In
particular, we are guided by a critically informed approach
to top-down design models and we argue for end user en-
gaged approaches which can take into account contextual
information and technical limitations.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
section 2, we discuss the issue of cheating in online games in
the context of existing work. Our approach is described in
the following three sections. Firstly, section 3 introduces the
main concepts related to player status, ranking and reputa-
tion. Section 4 then provides an empirically informed archi-
tecture for managing trust and consequently reputation and
section 5 presents a formalized model for integrating ranking
and reputation. Simulations of various scenarios involving
sequences of encounters between players, with an initial im-
plementation of our reputation and ranking model in place,
are described in section 6. Finally, section 7 contains a dis-
cussion of conclusions and scope for further work.
2. CHEATING IN ONLINE GAMES
Cheating is common in multiplayer games but is difficult
to prove [7]. Clearly the Internet provides players with a va-
riety of opportunities and methodologies necessary to cheat
in online games, in a situation in which anonymity and easy
exchange of cheating techniques (i.e. cheating tools such as
bots, macros or multi-clienting software) play a major role.
What is defined as cheating in digital games is often a mat-
ter of debate that involves several actors and technologies,
including players, service providers, governance documents
(such as End User License Agreements and Terms of Service)
and anti-cheating solutions. Indeed, to break the game rules
or exploit the game mechanics and obtain unfair advantage
cannot always be easily defined. In many cases it is hard
to precisely define the area and draw a line between cheat-
ing and not-cheating. Some players or even game providers
might find the practice of writing simple macros to carry
out repetitive tasks acceptable, whereas others might con-
sider this a form of cheating. Again, some players might
find the use of walkthroughs acceptable whereas other may
consider this a form of cheating.
In this regard Consalvo [8] has noticed that often what is
at the centre of these negotiations are what she calls “soft
rules”, or in other worlds those game rules that do not di-
rectly depend on the game computer code and that “can be
broken more easily than the game code” ([8], p.87). Con-
salvo, seems to argue that these “soft rules” are more or less
social rules and norms that can be found in virtual worlds.
This exploitation of “soft rules” might happen for example
in trade exchanges or in other cooperative actions among
players. Therefore, while we can agree that cheating gives
unfair advantages to players, we also must recognize the so-
cially negotiated process that leads to something being de-
fined as cheating. Despite this uncertainty in defining cheat-
ing, a number of different practices are commonly identified
as such, including lagging, user settings, exploits, ghosting,
aimbotting and triggerbot, wallhacking, disconnecting, cus-
tom kicking, stacking, farming, etc. (for a comprehensive
typology of cheating in online games, see [9] and [10]).
The multi-faceted nature of cheating in online games makes
cheating detection and prevention very difficult. Nonethe-
less, several efforts have been made to address this problem.
Some examples of anti-cheating techniques that can be found
in academic literature include the use of CAPTCHAs to de-
tect ‘bot’ users [11], anti-cheating protocols [12], techniques
for preventing software client modifications [13], and tech-
niques used to detect cheats in real-time games [14]. Game
developers and third party software developers have cre-
ated or are developing technologies that attempt to prevent
cheating. Anti-cheating tools are commonly used in popu-
lar games such as WoW. A few examples of game specific
anti-cheat tools software are DMW Anticheat, GameGuard,
PunkBuster, VAC, ProtectEnviron or the Warden. Consalvo
([8], ch.6) for example identifies and describes three different
typologies of tools: (1) tools that seek to prevent cheating
(for example by encrypting communications between server
and clients), (2) tools that seek to render cheating ineffective
(for example by disconnecting the cheater once detected),
and finally (3) tools that seek to detect the use of third party
software (such as bots) that tamper with software clients and
that, allow game companies to detect and ban cheaters.
One of the central concerns that relates to cheating is why
people do it: the motivations behind cheating. Our goal here
is not to exhaustively address this problem but rather to
highlight the social dimension of the problem. For example,
according to Parker [15], a “cheater cheats in order to have
a better chance of achieving their goals whatever they are”
(p.2). Hoglund and McGraw [16] for example clearly iden-
tify that one of the main reasons for cheating is obtaining
revenues (i.e. real money), where there are individuals who
make thousands of dollars by for example exploiting bugs
and duping items, that are successively sold in exchange of
real money. So, Hoglund and McGraw even come to sug-
gest that “cheats come closest to actual crime when they
are used to make a great deal of money” (p.8). Other mo-
tivations for cheating are listed by Consalvo ([8], p.95) who
identifies the boredom of some of the game tasks, the dif-
ficulty of the game, the limited scenarios or even just bad
games. For Hoglund and McGraw another reason for cheat-
ing in MMOGS is to level up quickly or to acquire rare items.
Finally Consalvo even identifies that some players just cheat
for the pleasure of doing it.
3. OUR APPROACH
Our approach is based on the integration of ranking and
reputation mechanisms. In order to identify cheaters with
high probability, we will base our reputation system on ac-
cusations of cheating made by players. We argue that, if
the proportion of cheaters is smaller than the proportion
of non-cheaters, then the non-cheaters can actively reduce
both the ranking and reputation of those avatars belong-
ing to cheaters and, as a result, diminish the motivation for
cheating. Such a virtual social system will be transparent
and can be supported by a properly designed Cheating Pre-
vention System (CPS).
3.1 Cheating Prevention System
How should the cheating prevention system behave? By
understanding this, we can then properly integrate the rep-
utation and ranking systems. The following could be con-
sidered as requirements of such a CPS:
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• There should be no cheaters among top ranking avatars;
• Avatars of suspected regular cheaters should have in
general lower reputation than non-cheaters;
• Some non-cheaters should be able to gain higher rank-
ing than suspected regular cheaters;
• The system should be fair with respect to all non-
cheaters: avatars with better skills and experience should
have higher ranking.
The CPS should be able to identify cheaters and minimize
their chances of gaining a high ranking. On the other hand,
fair players should be able to gain high ranking depending
on their skills and experience.
In general we would like that players with low reputation
should not have high ranking or have the possibility to gain
it easily. Players with high reputation should be able to gain
high ranking according to their skills and experience.
3.2 Introduction to Game Rankings
In MMOGs, ranking can be defined as a progressive struc-
ture/level of game avatars that might include several dimen-
sions. The ranking of avatars is constructed in a number of
ways. In games like WoW or Tibia, (see figure 1) for in-
stance, this is handled through a system of linear, progres-
sive empowerment measured by ‘experience’. As an avatar
explores, kills Non Player Character (NPC) monsters, and
completes quests, they will accrue experience, which in turn
increases their level. Progressive levels represent greater
competency of the avatar, measured through character at-
tributes such as ‘intelligence’, ‘strength’, and so on. Gaining
levels in turn allows the user to tackle more difficult quests
and monsters. This system ranks avatars, and is primarily
a function of time. Experience may be gained from cer-
tain forms of player-versus-player (PvP) combat in WoW,
but the reverse of this does not hold true; it is impossible
for one avatar to reduce the experience points of another
through combat. In Tibia instead the level of an avatar
can decrease when the avatar is killed either by monsters or
by other characters. This is called the ‘death penalty’ and
varies also according to the overall ranking of an avatar.
The use of levels is the most popular means by which
avatars in MMOGs are ranked, but there are other systems.
EVE Online, for example, uses ‘skills’ to represent more
specific abilities and traits an avatar embodies. Rather than
utilize quests or monsters, an avatar in EVE Online learns
skills automatically, requiring nothing more than time. To
an extent in EVE Online, ‘age’ replaces ‘level’ as a metric
for judging the ranking of an avatar, and an avatar with
more skills will generally be more capable than an avatar
with fewer ones.
The systems described above both introspectively gauge
the avatar against the system they inhabit in that they rank
‘time’, rather than ‘ability’ or ‘knowledge’ which would serve
to measure the user rather than the avatar. However, other
examples of ranking can be found within WoW, through its
Arena and Battleground competitions. For example, rank-
ing within Battleground is fleeting; the data posted to the
scoreboard lasts only as long as the match itself.
3.3 The Concept of Reputation
Reputation is what is generally said or believed about a
person’s or thing’s character or standing [17]. In partic-
Figure 1: Ranking Table of a Tibia server (with the
11 highest ranked characters according to level)
ular, reputation can be considered as a collective measure
of trustworthiness based on the ratings from members in
a community [17]. Reputation is known to be a ubiqui-
tous, spontaneous and highly efficient mechanism of social
control in societies and perhaps this is the reason why it
is used as a mechanism to stabilize social relationships in
computer-meditated communications, including therefore in
virtual societies such as online games. The central feature
of reputation is clearly described by [18] as follows “We wish
to know the sort of person we are dealing with before we
deal with him” (pg. 54). In other words, we would like to
know the qualities of other people when we interact with
them and we also wish to know how they are judged by the
social groups to which we belong.
Prior to the advent of the Internet, reputation was as-
sessed mostly via personal and face-to-face interactions. Ven-
dors provided references, offices tallied complaints, and past
personal experience and person-to-person gossip told you
on whom you could rely and on whom you could not [19].
With the advent of the Internet, assessment of reputation is
implemented in technological systems that can be used for
enhancing online reputation. Some of these systems are well
known, such as eBay ’s rating system or Slashdot ’s karma.
Systems like this simply assign a numeric value to the past
behavior of actors and compute a general value of reputation
(i.e. the sum of all the feedback of people who have dealt
with the actor). For a review, see [17].
Trust and reputation relationships exist also in MMOGs
(e.g. [4, 20]). According to Taylor [4], in MMOGs we
find complicated systems of trust, reliance and reputation
that often find major expression in the relationships among
guilds’ members, or even in other types of relationships such
as trade and exchanges. There are currently some reputa-
tion systems in MMOGs, but they have disparate goals and
none of them specifically intervene in rankings and against
cheating [21].
As noted in [22] an independent flexible reputation system
(or service) is required for many MMOGs. In this paper,
we examine the integration of a reputation system with the
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internal ranking system. This will potentially significantly
improve the user experience and scalability of MMOGs.
Kaiser and Feng [23] have developed a distributed reputa-
tion system for MMOGs that allows players to be informed
of previous misbehaviour by others and encourages the for-
mation of social networks of players that exclude those with
poor reputation. One general problem with reputation sys-
tems, noted by [23], is the issue of Sybil attacks [24] where a
participant effectively erases a poor reputation by creating
a new persona. The requirement to purchase software and
pay a subscription to participate in MMOGs helps to miti-
gate this, though we need to be wary of new players using
free short-term trial accounts. Reputation systems in other
domains, such as TrustRank [25], encourage the formation
of social networks that can reduce the effect of Sybils.
The main objective of this paper is to develop an approach
that enables the management, limitation and perhaps also
prevention of cheating on the basis of the reputation ratings
provided by the player community. The main idea behind
this approach is based on a tight integration between the
ranking of players and a reputation system. In our model,
players can rate/accuse each other if they suspect the other
party of cheating. The motivation behind this approach is
that if a player’s negative reputation can negatively influence
her ranking, then this should discourage cheating. Indeed
we can use accusations, the results of games between players
and current reputation of the players as the basis for updat-
ing the values of reputation and player ranking. As we will
see later, using some updating policies for both reputation
and ranking we can discourage cheaters. In this“fair” system
the game producers, non-cheaters and technology should be
able to combine to identify cheaters with high probability
and minimize their possibilities to gain a high ranking.
4. DISTRIBUTED TRUST & REPUTATION
MANAGEMENT
4.1 Representing reputation
Rather than having an entirely centralized view of repu-
tation, our system has the ability to manage reputation in a
distributed fashion. By this, we mean that the reputation of
a player is an aggregation based on how much other players
trust that this player is not a cheater. This has the poten-
tial to make it harder for a cheater to ‘game’ the reputation
system, as all players will not necessarily detect possible
cheating and do reputation updates in the same way. In any
case, trust by its nature is subjective and thus best managed
by the entity doing the trusting.
This approach is consistent with Gambetta’s definition
of trust as “a particular level of the subjective probability
with which an agent assesses that another agent or group
of agents will perform a particular action, ...” [26]. In the
simplest case, we model reputation/trust as being in a (0,1)
range, representing a behavior probability value as outlined
by Gambetta.
4.2 Trust Overlay Architecture
As in earlier work in a different context (security in peer-
to-peer networks) [27], we propose the overlay of a distributed
trust management infrastructure on top of the game infras-
tructure. With this architecture, illustrated in figure 2, a
trust management overlay operates separately from all as-
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Figure 2: Trust management overlay
pects of the game. Two message passing interfaces are de-
fined between the game layer and the trust management
layer and another between the trust managers of individual
nodes.
The interfaces are as follows:
(1) Experience reports: Game engine → Trust manager
(2) Reputation exchange: Trust manager ↔ Trust manager
(3) Reputation updates: Trust manager → Game engine
Game operation is as normal and is not directly affected by
the collection and sharing of reputation information. The
trust manager gathers game experience and uses this to-
gether with the experience of collaborating players to inform
its trust in other players.
We then need to have a system to build trust as players
gain experience of each other or learn of each other’s repu-
tation. In our system, trust can be updated in two ways:
1) Direct experience: Following an interaction between two
players A and B, each player may choose to update its trust
in the other based on the other player’s behavior.
2) Reputation: Player A notifies selected other players of the
reputation score that it has for player B. This will change
significantly following an interaction where A thinks that
B is cheating. How a player selects others with which to
share reputation information (the player’s social network)
is significant. There is scope for further work on the for-
mation and role of social networks in for sharing reputation
information to improve cheater detection.
5. INTEGRATED REPUTATION AND RANK-
ING MODEL
In our approach we assume that each player i has two pa-
rameters: ranking Ri and reputation/trust Ti. Both these
parameters are not necessarily numbers. They can be vec-
tors but, for the sake of simplicity in this paper, we will
assume that they are just numbers. Moreover for modelling
purposes we will assume that both the parameters are be-
tween 0 and 1. The top and bottom ranking correspond
to 1 and 0, respectively. Similarly, the highest and lowest
reputation will correspond to 1 and 0, respectively.
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Game Encounter. During the online game, a player
is involved in multiple interactions with other players, with
some result for the player including fights with other player(s),
collaboration, trading, etc. We will describe such interac-
tions as encounters. In this paper, for modelling purposes
and for the sake of simplicity, we will think of fights only but
our approach is applicable to different types of encounters.
We will assume that each game encounterE between play-
ers i and j results in a value Gi,j = Gi,j(E) that is equal
to Win, Lose, Draw or NA depending on whether player i
wins, loses, draws against player j. When the result of game
encounters is not defined then we will use the NA result (not
applicable).
Mutual Accusations of Cheating. After each game
encounter E, players can accuse or not accuse each other
of cheating. We introduce the accusation function Ai,j =
Ai,j(E), which is equal to Accuse or NotAccuse depending
on whether player i accuses player j of cheating or not during
their game encounter.
Encounter scores. After each game encounter between
two players i and j, the scores Si,j = Si,j(E) for both players
are generated according to the following formula:
Si,j = α · Pres(Gi,j , Ri, Rj) + β · Pac(Ti, Tj , Ai,j , Aj,i), (1)
Sj,i = α · Pres(Gj,i, Rj , Ri) + β · Pac(Tj , Ti, Aj,i, Ai,j), (2)
where Pres(·, ·, ·) and Pac(·, ·, ·, ·) are policies (or policy func-
tions) that influence the score value. In our model we will
assume that Si,j , Pres and Pac takes values between −1 and
1. Parameters α > 0, β > 0 are fixed and α+ β = 1.
We note that Pac() depends on the reputation of both
players and mutual accusations. On the other hand, Pres()
depends on the players’ rankings and the result of their en-
counter.
Reputation and Ranking Update Based on scores Si,j
and Sj,i, the reputations Ti, Tj of players i, j are updated
as follows:
Ti = max (a · Ti + (1− a) · Pac(Ti, Tj , Si,j , Sj,i), 0) (3)
Tj = max (a · Tj + (1− a) · Pac(Tj , Ti, Sj,i, Si,j), 0) (4)
where 0 < a < 1 is a fixed parameter. On the other hand,
the rankings Ri, Rj of players i, j are updated as follows:
Ri = b ·Ri + (1− b) · Si,j , (5)
Rj = b ·Rj + (1− b) · Sj,i (6)
where b is some (fixed) parameter, 0 < b < 1.
We note that the ranking update for players i, j depends
on scores Si,j , Sj,i only while the reputation depends on Pac
as well as scores Si,j , Sj,i.
Examples of Policy Functions. Here we provide
some examples of policy functions that will illustrate our
approach. We note that similar policy functions are used in
our experiments.
The policy function Pres(Gi,j , Ri, Rj) should reflect the
rankings of both players. The example below gives an idea
how it could look:
Pres(Gi,j , Ri, Rj) =
(
A+ · Rj , if i is a winner and j is a loser;
−A
−
· Rj , if i is a loser and j is a winner;
(7)
where A+ and A− are some fixed parameters (e.g. A+ =
A
−
= 1).
On the other hand, the policy function Pac(Ti, Tj , Ai,j , Aj,i)
should reflect the difference in reputations between the play-
ers and, obviously, mutual accusations. The example below
gives an idea of how it could look:
Pac(Ti, Tj , Ai,j , Aj,i) =
8>>><
>>>>:
B, if nobody accuses each other
−B
−
, if i is accused by j and Ti < Tj
B+, if i accuses j and Ti > Tj
Ti − Tj if i and j accuse each other
0, otherwise;
(8)
where B, B
−
and B+ are some fixed parameters (e.g. B =
B
−
= B+ = 1).
6. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
6.1 Simulation Setup
We suppose that there are N players, ordered in some way,
e.g. i = 1, . . . , N . Typically N is large, for example N =
1000. The ordering of players is not important. The number
of players for each experiment (simulation) is different.
A game is a sequence of encounters between players. The
sequence of encounters is modeled as some stochastic pro-
cess. Participants for each encounter are randomly (with
some probability distribution) chosen from the set of N play-
ers. After an encounter, each of the two players involved can
accuse (or not accuse) each other by claiming that an oppo-
nent is a cheater (or non-cheater).
In simulations we consider two types of players: cheaters
and non-cheaters. These types of players are distinguished
by their behavior: how easily they could win in encounters
and how often other players make accusations about them.
6.1.1 Encounter modeling
Here we consider a simplified case where the result of each
encounter for each player is either winning or losing. So
the result of an encounter between two players i and j is a
number Gi,j that is either Lose or Win. If Gi,j = Win then
this means that player i beats player j; if Gi,j = Lose then
this means that player j beats player i.
We model result Gi,j of each encounter between players i
and j as a Bernoulli random variable taking two values: Win
with probability pwini,j and Lose with probability 1− p
win
i,j .
In our experiments, probability pwini,j is defined depending
on players i and j. If the first player i is a cheater and
second player is a non-cheater then pwini,j = pcn, where in
our experiments we put pcn = 0.9, i.e. a cheater beats a
non-cheater in 90% of cases. If both participants are of the
same type, the probability is calculated as follows:
pwini,j =
Ri
Ri +Rj
, (9)
where Ri is the rating of player i and Rj is the rating of the
second player j.
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So probability pwini,j is defined as follows:
pwini,j =
8><
>:
pcn, i (cheater), j (non-cheater);
1− pcn, i (a non-cheater), j (cheater);
Ri
Ri+Rj
, otherwise.
(10)
In our experiments, we randomly define which participant
is the first player and which participant is the second player.
But because of symmetric properties of formula (10) this
choice does not influence the result of the encounter between
players. Note that the probability of winning for the player
with higher rating is higher than the probability of winning
for the player with the lower rating if they are both either
cheaters or non-cheaters.
6.1.2 Accusation modeling
After each encounter, each of two participants can make
(or not make) an accusation about the opponent. The de-
cision about whether player i should make an accusation
about player j is made with probability pacci,j . The value of
accusation Aij by player i about j could be Accuse if i made
accusation about j; otherwise it is NotAccuse.
Accusation probability pacci,j is calculated depending on the
pair of competitors. In our simulations, the accusations can
be done by a loser only. In that case the accusation proba-
bility pacci,j is calculated as follows:
pacci,j =
8>><
>>:
acc, i (cheater), j (cheater);
anc, i (non-cheater), j (cheater);
acn, i (cheater), j (non-cheater);
ann, i (non-cheater), j (non-cheater);
(11)
where typically we set the parameters as follows:
• acc = 0.8 (cheaters accuse each other often);
• anc = 0.9 (a non-cheater accuses a cheater often);
• ann = 0.1 (non-cheaters accuse each other rarely);
• acn = 0.9 (a cheater accuses a non-cheater often).
6.2 Simulation Results
In this section, we present results of some simulations that
illustrate the dynamics of our anti-cheating approach.
We have two types of players: cheaters and non-cheaters.
In each experiment, we fix the total number of players and
designate a proportion of these to behave as cheaters. The
game is then modeled as a sequence of discrete encounters
between two players. The players for each encounter are
chosen randomly. After an encounter, each player can accuse
(or not accuse) the other player of cheating.
Two scenarios are presented for illustration purposes, each
with 1000 players. In the first case 10% are cheaters and in
the second case 30% are cheaters. For each of these scenar-
ios, we would like to examine the dynamics of the reputation
scores and ranking scores for the players.
Reputation values can be in the range (0,1) and are ini-
tially set to 1 (high). As cheaters are detected and accusa-
tions made about them, their reputation values are reduced.
Non-cheaters can occasionally be falsely accused of cheating,
which may temporarily impact on their reputations as well.
Ranking scores indicates how well the player performs in
the game. Rankings, for our simulations, can be in the range
(0,100) and are initially set to zero for new players. As play-
ers get better at the game, their scores rise. In the case of
Figure 3: Cheaters’ reputation statistics (10% of
1000 cheating)
Figure 4: Cheaters’ reputation statistics (30% of
1000 cheating)
cheaters, an initial rise in ranking is (hopefully) counteracted
by increasing accusations of cheating and their rankings fall
back towards zero. The rankings of non-cheaters can be
expected to be distributed over the range of possible scores.
The histograms presented in this section show snapshots
of reputation and ranking score statistics after various num-
bers of encounters (note that, for a large number of encoun-
ters, this number is approximately a function of time, so
we are effectively seeing time dynamics). We use a roughly
logarithmic scale to select the numbers of encounters after
which we take snapshots for illustration. The units shown
on the histograms (enc/plyr) denote average number of en-
counters per player. The highest value of average number of
encounters per player shown in each case is chosen to be suf-
ficient to illustrate when the system has stabilized (i.e. when
all the cheaters have effectively been detected and their rep-
utations are zero). This takes longest where the proportion
of cheaters is greatest.
The histograms are scaled, i.e. the percentages of players
in each range are shown, rather than the absolute number.
6.2.1 Reputation and Ranking Statistics: Cheaters
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the dynamics of reputation for
cheaters in each of the two scenarios under consideration.
Initially they all have a high reputation (1.0), but accusa-
tions of cheating cause this to be reduced progressively until
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Figure 5: Cheaters’ score statistics (10% of 1000
cheating)
Figure 6: Cheaters’ score statistics (30% of 1000
cheating)
it reaches zero. The greater the proportion of cheaters, the
slower this process is.
Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the dynamics of ranking scores
for cheaters in each of the two scenarios under consideration.
Initially scores start at zero and then tend to rise initially.
Then the rise in score is counteracted by increasing accusa-
tions of cheating and their scores fall back towards zero.
6.2.2 Reputation and Ranking Statistics: Non-cheaters
Figure 7 illustrates the dynamics of reputation for normal
players (i.e. non-cheaters) in one of the scenarios, specifi-
cally the 30% cheaters case. A small number of non-cheaters
can tend to fall below 1 while cheaters are still present with
some reputation intact, but this is resolved as cheaters are
correctly detected. Figure 8 illustrates the dynamics of rank-
ing scores for normal players in the same scenario. Players
tend to get better at the game over time.
7. DISCUSSION
We believe that the approach proposed in this paper has
much potential in supporting activities such as the identifica-
tion or even the prevention of cheating activities in MMOGs.
In particular it is important to keep in mind that what is
proposed here is a system that could help game providers
to remove those cheaters that are at the top of the game
rankings and that are there precisely because of cheating.
Figure 7: Non-cheaters’ reputation statistics (30%
of 1000 cheating)
Figure 8: Non-cheaters’ score statistics (30% of 1000
cheating)
7.1 Limitations and scope for future work
It is clear that cheating is not always easy to define and it
involves a range of different activities (e.g. farming, botting,
manipulation of trust, bug exploits, and so on) and that per-
haps the reputation/ranking system could suffer from how
players and game providers define cheating. We are also
aware however that many of these cheating practices cannot
be easily controlled by means of purely software solutions.
This is certainly the main reason why we rely on an addi-
tional “social mechanism” (reputation/ranking) to identify
cheating. At the same time, we are aware that exploitation
of the reputation system can lead itself to “cheating” and
perhaps some “tamper-proof” strategies will be required.
7.1.1 Multiple Avatars
An approach that only trusts a single avatar has the fol-
lowing limitations:
• Multiple avatars can be used to discredit others re-
gardless of whether or not they cheat.
• With multiple avatars a player could manipulate rep-
utation for his or her own advantage.
• In cases where multiple avatars are related to one single
account, some checks can be made using software.
• The system could support punishment of those cases
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in which there is an abuse of the reputation system by
means of multiple avatars.
• Multiple avatars reporting can influence indeed repu-
tation and ranking (for the advantage of the player).
The reputation/reporting system should take account of
these issues, in particular the problem of a player possessing
multiple avatars. Adopting an “account” strategy can per-
haps provide the means to tackle other problems and social
conflicts such as harassment or fraud. Moreover, the reputa-
tion system could embody features to allow a user who feels
they have been ‘accused’ unfairly to contest the accusation.
7.1.2 Guilds and Social Groups
Many MMOGs encourage players to form guilds, i.e. groups
of players that share the same goals. We are aware that a co-
ordination of reporting operated by a guild can influence the
reputation system for its own advantage and reduce both the
ranking and reputation of the target(s). At the same time
it may be difficult to identify if several members of a guild
are colluding against other players. This can happen when
guilds have facilities outside the games (e.g. an external
mailing list or forum) that can be used for the organization
of coordinated ratings that could significantly influence both
reputation and ranking of the target player/avatar.
7.2 Conclusion
In conclusion, we are of the opinion that in some cases rep-
utation could be part of the overall properties of an avatar,
very much like experience, skills, mana(s) and other charac-
teristics. This might be quite effective in several situations.
For instance, our empirical observations of WoW suggest
that, in servers where there is a strong sense of community,
reputation might become important in itself. In such con-
texts, abuse of the reputation system or accusation of cheat-
ing might be seen as too risky. In this case, the system could
constitute a useful prevention of unacceptable behavior.
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